Richard Kandt says of the Batussi:

181 "If I analyze my feelings and state them honestly, I must say that I was impressed by them. Even now I have not lost this feeling although my mind rebels against it and although I have told myself hundreds of times that these people are, after all, barbarians far inferior to me intellectually. But it is of no avail! I have explained to myself the source of this feeling, so unusual to experience toward a colored person ... Apart from the gigantic stature, apart from the nobility of each movement and the dignity of their manner of speech, apart from the tasteful unobtrusive manner in which they dress, apart from their refined features and the calm penetrating, often even mocking and provocative eyes, apart from all this, there still is -- and here I hesitate and am unable to formulate the dim obscure feelings which hover in my imagination." (No. 22, p. 266.)

[524] This is a sentimental but a very understandable judgment. In actual fact the Batussi are a ruling caste, but not a ruling race in the ethical sense.

583 186 ● 156 Gradually one discovers the secret of the tremendous superiority of the relatively few Batussi over the one and a half million Bahutu: they are greatly superior to them in intelligence, calmness, composure, cruelty, cunning, racial pride, solidarity, and political talent. What strikes one most about the individual Mutussi, apart from his imposing outward appearance which certainly must have made a great impression on the Muhutu from the beginning, is first his calm and what appears to be unconcerned reserve. In his contact with the restless, impulsive, thoughtless Muhutu, this has always been to his advantage. [609] Further one is struck by the arrogance he displays even toward Europeans, by his abysmal mendacity and cowardice when faced with any disagreeable situation. The Mutussi regards himself and his kind as the crown of creation, as a paragon of cleverness and political skill. This is small wonder, for the inferiority of the relatively few tribes within his sphere of vision -- intentionally kept narrowly circumscribed -- and the fact that a Batussi minority rules the large Bahutu people were bound to increase his feeling 186 609 of importance beyond all measure. It is true that he fears the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

indices and the lynching of Negroes in the Southern States of the Union. There is evidently no rational means for the whites of the south to impute the responsibility for the lack of rain—which was then the cause of the poor cotton crops—to Negroes. This typically irrational behaviour, however, becomes comprehensible if we accept the frustration-aggression sequence. In this sense, it can be said that the relation between the two phenomena, economic crises and lynching, is a logical relation.[8]

Ruanda political relations disclose one of the premises of that culture. Underlying the political and feudal structures there was a general assumption about human relations. In order to formulate it as accurately as may be possible, I shall first consider more closely the social roles of the superior and inferior in the field of political and feudal relations. In the following section the words 'ruler' and 'subject' refer to superiors and inferiors in the administrative, military, and clientage structures.

2. THE RULER'S AND SUBJECT'S SOCIAL ROLES

The analysis of the political organization of Ruanda indicates that the ruler was expected to assume a complex role towards his subject. The two poles of it were protection and profit. The subordinate was somebody whom one protected: he was also a resource from which it was normal to draw some advantage.

Protection was not restricted to a certain field of action, but potentially encompassed the whole of the subject's life. When the inferior needed some help, any help, he was expected to apply to his ruler even if the issue was completely alien to the sphere of the main relations between the ruler and the subject. A client could ask his *shobuja* for aid in matters not pertaining to cattle and *buhake* services. It was even thought proper for the ruler to interfere in difficulties which his subject through his own misdemeanour had run into as, for instance, when an inferior had been caught stealing from somebody. When protection was refused, it was not because the question was not the ruler's concern, but on other grounds, such as disloyalty.

The extent of that protection was not strictly defined. It did not constitute for the ruler a set of particular and fixed obligations. The subordinate had a general right to be protected but very few claims to particular advantages. In *buhake*, when one offered one's

[8] Delhaut, 1935, p. 44 (quoted by Maquet, 1951, p. 166).

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

services to a lord in order to become his client, one was entitled to receive usufruct of his cattle. But the number of cows was not determined. It could be one or twenty or fifty or even more.

It was up to the ruler to decide if any protection was to be granted and to what extent. Of course the pressure of public opinion obliged him not to refuse aid to his subordinate unless he had some socially accepted reason to do so (such as the subordinate's disobedience), but the measure of the protection depended on his own will and pleasure.

These characteristics of the protective attitude (care of the whole of the subordinate's life, its very variable extent being left to the superior's judgement) allow us to apply to it the qualification of 'paternalistic'. Paternalism is understood here as 'the principle of acting in a way like that of a father towards his children. Because of the total dependency of the human offspring, during their first years, on those who nurse and educate them—and they are usually their parents—the latter's authority ranges over the whole of the life of the child. In everything he needs his parents, in everything they have to direct and control him. Moreover, parents sovereignly judge what they are going to give their children. Undoubtedly, their social groups force them to secure for their children the protection they need to live and develop but the children may not require such or such a particular service. Parents decide without further ado what is suitable for the child and think that better than he they know what is 'best for him'.

A paternal relation does not exclude profit. In describing the Ruanda's father's role towards his sons, I mentioned that the father's interests were usually thought to be predominant in respect of the children's interests. When inferiors were not the superior's children but his subjects or clients, that aspect of profit was much more emphasized. All those who occupied the inferior position in the relations of the political and feudal structures had dues to give and tribute labour to perform for the profit of their superiors, and some of these obligations were heavy. It did not appear at all unusual to Ruanda that power brought many privileges to those who had it. If one is a chief, is it not fitting to draw advantages from one's situation? Here, again, the extent of the subject's obligations was left within very broad limits to the superior's discretion.

The ruler's role seems to have been that paternalistic blend of

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

protection and profit. Of course, that role was not always perfectly fulfilled. Chiefs who have been more exploiters than protectors are remembered. It was by comparison with that ideal picture that their behaviour was judged and blamed.

The subject was expected to have a role complementary to the one we have just described. He was supposed to assume an attitude of dependency. Inferiority is the relative situation of a person who has to submit to another in a well delimited field. Dependence is inferiority in the whole of life. When the ruler gives an order, he has to be obeyed, not because his order falls within the field over which he has authority, but because he is a ruler.

It could be objected that in Ruanda this attitude of dependence was not in principle unlimited. We saw that cattle- and land-chiefs could not require as many dues as they liked, that subjects could resort to higher authorities against their immediate chiefs, and that it was possible to oppose one chief against another. This does not change the fact that the dependent attitude was the only one socially expected of the subject. Indeed it was impossible to be considered a 'good' subject if one asserted independence of one's superior. A claim of independence, even limited, obliged one to leave the superior, to ask for the support of another and to assume towards the latter an attitude of complete compliance. This appeared clearly in the feudal relation. A lord could not be refused what he asked (even at the present time a shop assistant who is obliged by the law to sell only for cash, will find it very difficult not to sell on credit to his lord). He could only be deserted for another.

3. FORMULATION OF THE INEQUALITY PREMISE

When paternalism and dependence define the permanent roles expected from two persons, much more is implied than when they express the transitory roles of a father and his young son. In the latter case it is known that the son will grow up and one day, even if he has to wait till after his father's death, will be equal to what his father was when the latter was young. But when paternalism and dependence are linked in permanent reciprocal roles, the assumption is that there is a fundamental inequality between the two persons. The subject will never grow up, he will never 'reach his majority'. It is implied without any doubt that there is between the ruler and his subject a difference so fundamental that it never can be suppressed. This fundamental inequality of men is the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

different share in social power and fundamentally different rights.

The Ruanda principle of inequality could be expressed in the following terms: people born in different castes are unequal in inborn endowment, physical as well as psychological and have consequently fundamentally different rights.

That premise, closely connected with the caste structure, is suggested by the analysis of the political and feudal structures. Indeed, when a principle of inequality exists in a society with respect to a certain type of relations, it does not fail to spread to other relations more or less similar. In Ruanda, the inegalitarian premise of inter-caste relations has permeated the intricate relations which could be regarded as analogous in certain respects. A Tutsi who was lord over another Tutsi was thought to be superior over his client in a way comparable to the manner in which he was superior over his Hutu clients. Of course significant differences remained between inter- and intra-caste relationships of superiority, but the latter tended to be patterned on the former ones.

The extension to intricate relations of the premise of inter-caste inequality made it a principle of integration with a very wide bearing as it could, and did, in fact, pervade all the human relations in which a superiority of one actor over the other was implied. It could be the relation between a mother and her young child, a father and his son, a man and his wife, an old man and a youngster, a craftsman and an apprentice, &c. These relations constituting the texture of social life, the impact on collective living of the premise of fundamental inequality, cannot be over-estimated.

4. THE THEOREMS

In order to understand better how the inequality premise influenced the whole of Ruanda social life, the different aspects of that influence must be made explicit. They will be expressed as a set of theorems, by which is meant general propositions or statements which are not self-evident.

Theorem One

When two persons are involved in any kind of social relation, it is their mutual hierarchical situation which is regarded as the most relevant element of the relation.

Superiority and inferiority were *facts* of the Ruanda social structure to such an extent that as soon as they entered as a

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

component in the content of a social intercourse, other components were regarded as less important and were coloured by the hierarchical situation of the two actors. In Euro-American culture, relationships of inferiority are defined not only as regards the people taking part in them but also as regards the matters concerned. A business executive may give orders to one of his employees only within very well-defined limits of competence and time, but he cannot oblige him to accept his views on for instance artistic or political questions. In Ruanda, on the contrary, when one of the persons involved in a dyad was superior to the other from a certain point of view, the superiority was diffused, as it were, through the whole relation. For his subject, a chief was always a chief in whatever matter.

This first theorem is a consequence of inequality conceived as essential. When two persons are considered unequal by nature, the superiority of one over the other cannot be limited to a certain sphere. Obedience in everything must be required: there is no field in which a father could be wrong and his son right.

Theorem Two

As in almost any human relation there is some superiority of one actor over the other, as that aspect is always stressed and as inferiority relations are patterned on inter-caste relations, paternalistic, and dependent attitudes were to be found in almost every human relation in Ruanda.

The only exceptions were relations between people who were equal from any point of view, as for instance young men of about the same age, belonging to the same caste and whose families were about at the same level of wealth.

This is very noticeable today, even in relations with Europeans. A clerk usually assumes towards the European he assists, a dependent attitude different from the behaviour of a European employee. The clerk expects from his employer a behaviour similar to the paternalistic attitude of the Ruanda superiors and he is puzzled and disappointed if the employer does not assume such an attitude.

Theorem Three

There is no private sector in the life of the inferior *vis-à-vis* his superior. The superior has the right to control the whole of his

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

subordinate's activities. This is not resented by the inferior as unbearable meddling. On the contrary, it is expected by the inferior who feels that such interference is a proof of the interest his superior extends to him. When a European employer avoids intruding into the privacy of a Ruanda subordinate, the latter not infrequently tends to interpret it as a withdrawal from the protective role expected from any superior.

If a subordinate were to refuse his Ruanda superior's interference on the grounds that he should not be concerned with his private affairs, such a pretension would be regarded as at least a definite lack of respect.

Theorem Four

Strictly contractual relations are not possible. To enter into a contract implies that the intended parties are previously independent of one another. If one is submitted to the other for the whole of his life, how could he freely commit himself to give the other certain services? And how could the other promise to secure his inferior a counterpart that the latter can legally claim? When entering into contractual relations, it is necessary that each prospective partner should be a person independent of and equal to the other in that context. In the Western world, admittedly, it frequently happens that an agreement which verifies the juridical forms of a contract is entered into by persons who are not independent and equal. Circumstances may exert such a pressure that freedom to accept or refuse a particular obligation is purely illusory. Conditions of independence and equality, however, are often realised. In ancient Ruanda such a situation could almost never have happened as it was rare for two persons who might otherwise be related by a contract, not to be already involved in paternalistic and dependent relations.

Moreover, after the contract has been concluded it is necessary that each partner should be able to defend himself against any demand of the other which would exceed the terms of the covenant, and that he should have the means to oblige the other to fulfil what the latter has agreed to give or to do. This implies again that one part is not completely dependent on the other. Now, as I mentioned earlier, the extent of the superior's obligations is left, in Ruanda, to his will and pleasure. Consequently, it was unthinkable for the party who was at the same time in a position

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

inferior to the other to claim some particular fulfilment of the agreed promises from the other.

This appears clearly in the difficulties Ruanda often meet when they have to adjust themselves to European labour contracts. They are sometimes confused by the fact that the employer requires from them at the same time less and more than they expect. Less because the employer does not ask for more services, for longer office hours for instance, than what has been stipulated, and more because he is very exacting in the execution of what has been undertaken, for instance in matters of punctuality.

Theorem Five

With such socially accepted conceptions about inequality, those who occupy the superior positions in most of the social relations in which they are involved, tend to develop a permanent authoritarian behaviour. This is characterized by a propensity to command, to be self-assertive, arrogant, protective, and compassionate.

Chiefs, rulers, and other superiors try to extend not only the size or range of their power (the number of people controlled) but its density (the degree of control of the subordinates).[7] Any independence manifested by the inferior will be resented as rebellious.

This leads to intolerance. The superior's opinions should never be opposed by the inferior who is always and everywhere expected to manifest his dependence by attitudes of compliance. Even today this conduct tends to prevail. Some years ago a Ruanda deliberative assembly of people of standing was asked its opinion on a contemplated reform. After the most important person present there had given his opinion, everybody voted for his proposal. But after the meeting many expressed privately their divergent opinions. At the time of the vote, they had considered it improper and impolite not to agree with the superior.

Theorem Six

Even if the caste system and political and feudal institutions have succeeded to a large extent in moulding personalities in such a way as to make inferiors self-effacing, submissive, compliant, and dependent, the conditioning has not been perfect. Often the inferior wants to disagree with his superior's opinions, to avoid executing an order or obeying his commands. A straight refusal

[7] Cf. Russell, 1938, pp. 163 *f.*

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

being regarded as insulting, disrespect or revolt, the only way out for the inferior is to appear to behave always as expected: to fall in with any desire of his superior while concealing his own opinion, never to say no to any order but to find clever excuses for not doing it. Consequently dissimulation is very highly thought of and a skill necessary to master for someone wanting to live more or less securely under such a political régime.

Many stories and proverbs give evidence of the frequency of covert disobedience to the rulers and of the appreciation in which an astute excuse and a 'good lie' were held. This was the only way to adapt oneself to such a situation.

Theorem Seven

It is commonly accepted in the Western tradition that truth has a high value and that language is the medium used to express 'truth', that is to say, 'what reality appears to be to the person who speaks'. Undoubtedly, in Western practice, language is used, even in the cognitive sphere, for many other purposes than to express what the speaker thinks. Moreover, most of the scholars who, in recent years, have studied the problem of the origin and function of language, bring qualifications to the traditional view. In the almost unanimous opinion of the carriers of Western culture, however, the ideal verbal behaviour must express 'truth' and not what is useful to the speaker. This is, for example, what is inculcated into children in schools.

In a society in which human relations are imbued with some cultural premises as the one being considered in this chapter, 'truth' cannot be recognized as a dominant value. Indeed, one is supposed to use language not to say what is thought to conform to reality but what is thought to conform to the ruler's opinion. Nobody, the ruler included, entertains many illusions on the sincerity of what is said, but submission has been expressed at the right time and this is felt to be most important.

This theorem could be formulated in this way: the verbal behaviour towards a superior must express dependence rather than 'truth'.

Theorem Eight

Once it is taken for granted that in hierarchical relations, behaviour must conform to the superior's expectations even to the